Abstract. In recent years, many cryptography protocols have been designed, for many different scenarios, with the purpose of preserving security of communications as well as privacy and anonymity of participant entities. In general, every proposed solution has possed a real challenge to the existing formal methods of protocol analysis and verification. The main goal of this work is the proposal of a logic to reason about privacyenhancing monotonic and non-monotonic cryptography protocols. The new logic will be called L-PEP and it extends the existing Rubin's logic of beliefs. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Introduction
This work has been mainly motivated by the following two factors. On the one hand, organizations are increasingly introducing privacy preserving mechanisms to comply with laws and regulations and, to satisfy users' and employees' privacy requirements. As as result, newly designed system architectures require of additional privacy and security features such as anonymity and pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability of transactions, selective disclosure of information, privacy policies embedded in data, etc [1] . Many attempts have been made to design new cryptography protocols to provide such strong privacy properties. In particular, the set of building block primitives used in privacy-enhancing cryptography protocols include anonymous credentials, blind signatures, dual signatures, recursive hashing, zero-knowledge proofs, identity-based encryption, anonymous biometrics, etc. As it happens, in every occasion the proposed cryptographic solution has possed a real challenge to the existing formal methods of protocol analysis and verification as none of the existing methods include the necessary inference rules to formally reason about those operations [2] .
To this regard, the formal modeling of protocol privacy requirements represents a significant step forward, as it will allow us to validate protocol privacy properties, in the same way as it is done with security properties such us confidentiality, integrity or accessibility. However, not very much work has been done in this direction so far.
On the other hand, privacy-enhancing technologies have placed the emphasis on determining the so called Private Data Life Cycle. Private data life cycle starts when data is created and finishes when the data is destroyed. The aim of those new technologies and the security protocols deployed to such effect is to control the whole cycle, including implicit and explicit disclosures of information, deletion of data, custody constraints, etc. For example, a common privacy constraint describes users' requirements to determine how long for entities are entitled to use or store someone else's private information, which might have been received in one of the steps of a cryptographic protocol. That is, via privacy policies and agreements, users could force other entities to delete and destroy users' own personal data after a fixed amount of time or, if data are not further required for any of the purposes which they were stored for [3] . Formally, a non-monotonic security protocol refers to the non-incremental acquisition of knowledge by participants along the execution of a security protocol. In fact, participant entities might have to forget information or data which they once knew or held, during a particular protocol instance. Again, formal representation and verification of non-monotonic schemes is still pending a global solution and not very much work has been carried out in this direction so far.
Since the design of BAN logic by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [4] , many derivatives of BAN, as well as new logics, have been defined to formally and monotonically reason about cryptographic protocols. They are also known as Logics of Beliefs, as protocol goal verification is based on the set of beliefs and possessions that entities hold at the end of a protocol execution (for example, entity A believes K AB is a secret key to communicate with entity B). In this context, monotonicity refers to the way in which the knowledge and the beliefs of a particular entity increase as the protocol execution progresses. In a monotonic protocol, once something is known, it is known forever.
By contrast, a non-monotonic logic would allow us to reason about nonmonotonic protocols, in which entities might stop believing in a piece of information, or forget knowledge during the execution of a protocol. This is, in fact, the type of reasoning it is needed for the formal verification of many of today's privacy-enhancing cryptography protocols which rely on the deletion of information. Only a few attempts have been made to elaborate on this type of reasoning [5] [6] [7] . In [5] authors define a not operator to construct negation. In [6, 7] authors include actions to directly delete beliefs from entities' belief sets. We have chosen Rubin's logic [7] to be the focus of our study. The main reasons being that Rubin's logic is more tractable than Moser's [6] and furthermore, it allows us to differentiate between non-monotonicity of knowledge and non-monotonicity of belief. In addition, Rubin's logic does not require protocol idealization and the notation and the reasoning are similar to the original BAN logic [4] .
Overview of Our Work
The main goal of this work is the proposal of a logic to reason about privacyenhancing cryptographic protocols. The new logic will be called L-PEP and it extends Rubin's logic of beliefs [7] . Rubin's logic is extended by adding new inference rules and actions and by enhancing some of the original actions and rules. L-PEP, as presented in this paper, is defined to allow us to formally reason about cryptographic hashing, recursive cryptographic hashing, concatenation of hashes, dual signatures, identity-based encryption and blind signatures, all these being primitives of existing privacy-enhancing cryptography protocols. In this paper, and to illustrate how the formalism works, we formally analyze two different protocols. First, we apply the new L-PEP Logic to the analysis of the dual signature mechanism defined in SET (Secure Electronic Transaction protocol) [8] . Formal verification of dual signatures will be very relevant to other scenarios such as, privacy-preserving authentication and access control mechanisms. Second, we will formally reason about a privacy-enhancing non-monotonic protocol, applied to an electronic speed ticketing system in vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). We will give a brief description of the system and analyze vehicular privacy related goals.
Previous related work can be found in [9] [10] [11] . In [9] and [10] authors use Rubin's Logic to formally analyze an e-commerce protocol and two authentication protocols respectively. However, the analysis is monotonic (i.e. only incremental knowledge is considered) and no signatures applied to hashed values (signatures with appendix) are formally considered during the protocols' formal analysis. Finally, in [11] , a non-monotonic authenticated routing protocol is analyzed in which entities must forget other participant's public key certificates once these are revoked by the corresponding authorities. In that work, neither privacy related goals nor signatures applied to hashed values are formally analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe Rubin's logic main components including the additional features and enhancements proposed in this work. In Section 3 we illustrate the new formalism giving formal proof of privacy related goals regarding the Dual signature mechanism in the SET protocol. In Section 4 we illustrate the new formalism giving formal verification of a vehicular speed ticketing electronic protocol. Finally, Sections 5 and 5.1 are devoted to establish final considerations and future work, respectively.
Rubin's Logic
In this section we present an extension as well as few amendments to the nonmonotonic logic introduced by Rubin in [7] . Some of the concepts and notation have been synthesized, please refer to [4] and [7] for a detailed description.
Non-monotonicity of Knowledge vs. Non-monotonicity of Belief
Rubin introduced a logic in which it is easy to difference between non-monotonicity of knowledge and non-monotonicity of belief in the following way: while entities know things such as keys, nonces, or data, entities believe in metadata, such as freshness of data, or in other entities' possessions. When a principal stops believing in something it does not imply it also stops possessing such an item or knowing the data. By contrast, if an entity stops possessing or knowing an item, it does automatically stop believing in it as it does not longer hold it. This fact is very relevant in today's schemes. Principals are forced, via privacy agreements, to forget (stop storing and destroy) certain information and some protocols base their correctness on that premise. Furthermore, forgetting information implies readjustments in other principals' sets of beliefs. For example, a merchant forgets the user's card details after a transaction is processed, and the user stops believing that the merchant possesses such information.
Special notation:
Denotes entity P i private key.
Denotes entity P i public key.
{X} k
Denotes token X encrypted with key K.
Global definitions:
The specification of a protocol is the starting point of the analysis.
-Set of participants: W denotes the whole World of entities. P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } ⊆ W denotes the set of entities participating in the protocol. -Set of inference rules: R denotes the set of inference rules. Each entity applies these rules to its sets of beliefs and knowledge. -Set of secrets: S denotes the set of secrets. Data which is meant to be kept secret from the World. For each secret s ∈ S the set Observers(s) denotes the set of entities which know secret s. Every communication is assumed to be listened by the whole World so after each communication, a function Update will recursively update the appropriate Observers sets. The Update functions also operates over the set of possessions of each entity. -TRUST Matrix : A matrix TRUST is used to represent the trust relationship between every pair of principals. An entity P i is said to trust entity P j if P i behaves as though P j will follow the protocol. -Free variables: F V denotes the set free variables to be instantiated along the formal proof. -Bound variables: BV denotes the set bound variables which must hold the same value throughout the whole formal proof.
Definitions local to each protocol participant:
Local sets are private to each protocol participant.
-Set of Possessions: P OSS(P i ) denotes the possessions of participant P i . For example:
Pi }. This is, P i possesses (knows) X and private key k
−1
Pi .
-Set of Beliefs: BEL(P i ) denotes the beliefs of participant P i . For example:
Pj , k} ∈ P OSS(P j )}. This is, P i believes that k is a fresh key and that P j is in possession of private key k
Pj and secret key k. , m) , to denote sending a message m to P j or receiving a message m from P j , respectively. After a receive(P j , m) message operation is performed the corresponding P OSS sets are modified accordingly. After a send message operation is performed the Update function is recursively called to modify the appropriate Observers sets.
• AL denotes an ordered list of zero or more actions that participants have to perform along the protocol execution. These actions are described in detail in section 2.5.
List of Actions
Describe how entities perform operations over data. All variables involved in these formula are considered to be bound variables. Only those actions related to our scope are listed and only the new ones are described in detail. Please refer to [7] for a complete list.
This new action is used when P i applies the function f to X in a recursive way. Function f could be a hash function, a polynomial, a biometric template, a boolean function, XOR, etc.
Description: This new action is used when a principal decrypts an encrypted item with the corresponding private key. A5. Decrypt-signature({X} k
This new action is used when a principal decrypts an encrypted item with the corresponding public key. Note that this rule refers to message recovery signature schemes. A6. Encrypt(X; k)
Set of Inference Rules
After each action, each participant updates its BEL set using all possible inference rules. Note that, rules are used to propagate belief during the protocol run whereas actions are used to propagate knowledge. We will now describe the most relevant rules for the scope of our work. Only the new ones are fully described.
R1. Function Rule
This new rule states that if P j believes that P i possesses f and X then, P j believes that
In [12] authors propose some new hash inference rules to add to BAN logic, however, these rules enforce sender authentication for every hash value received. By contrast, we propose a new signature verification rule such that, we are able to link a signed hash value to its original unsigned value by authenticating the signer entity of the hash. Indeed, the expression {h(X) ∈ P OSS(P j )} ∈ BEL(P i ) is true if and only if the action Decrypt-signature({h(X)} k
) has been applied successfully.
R4. Split Rule
This rule states that if P i knows function f , then it can split concatenated items. This is common as knowing a function will give us information about the length of its output.
Formal Verification Process
The verification process is a recursive, automated process in which inference rules and the Update function are recursively applied until none of the rules can proceed any further and the Observer sets cannot be modified. Note that the processes described in the next sections are incomplete as they only highlight the most relevant steps.
SET's Dual Signature
To illustrate how the formalism described in previous sections works, and how it can be used to formally reason about privacy properties, we introduce the dual signature mechanism used in the SET protocol [8] for e-commerce transactions. The goal of the dual signature mechanism is to implement a minimum information disclosure 1 procedure. As previously mentioned, although various attempts have been made to formally reason about SET [14] , the hash inference rule applied was not correct [15] .
Notation:
{U, M, B} Denotes the set of participant entities: User, Merchant and Bank. K
−1 U
Denotes user U private key.
Denotes a secret key between the user U and the merchant M .
Denotes a secret key between the user U and the bank B. h Cryptographic hash function.
-Step 1: User U wants to proceed with an electronic purchase. User U constructs an Order Information token denoted as OI describing the concept of the purchase, quantity, price, etc. Additionally, U also generates a Payment Information token denoted by P I, including the card details and the amount to be paid. Item OI is destined to the Merchant M and item P I is destined to the Bank B. Both items must be linked as the user must be able to prove that the payment is intended for the corresponding order, however, OI must be kept secret from B as well as P I must be kept secret from the merchant M . -Step 2: User U sends Merchant M the following message:
In receiving this item, entity M can verify the user's signature over item OI and can also establish the link between the OI and P I without getting to know the content of P I. -Step 3: User U sends the Bank B the following message:
}}

KUB
In receiving this item, entity B can verify the user's signature over item P I and can also establish the link between the OI and P I without getting to know the content of OI.
SET's Dual Signature Formal Verification
As the formal reasoning of steps 2 and 3 are equivalent, we will only proceed with the formal verification of steps 1 and 2.
Global and local definitions:
-W , the world. -P = {U, B, M }, is the set of participant entities.
Where h represents a cryptographic hash function, OI the order information and PI the payment information. 
Note that entity M would believe that {K
−1
U ∈ P OSS(U )} and ♯K U once the corresponding public key certificate has been properly verified.
Expected security and privacy goals:
G1: {OI} ∈ P OSS(M ). M possesses item OI
G2: Observers(OI)={U,M} . Secret OI must only be known by U and M
G3: {OI ∈ P OSS(U )} ∈ BEL(M ) . M must believe that U possesses OI
G4: {{h(OI)∥h(P I)} ∈ P OSS(U )} ∈ BEL(M ) . M must believe that U possesses {h(OI)∥h(P I)}
G5: Observers(P I)={U,B} . Secret P I must only be known by U and B
Formal proof:
Only those steps in relation to the satisfaction of goals are shown.
Step 1: bvr
Step 2: bvr
The Update function, recursively applied until the end of the verification process, renders the following results over the secrets OI and P I:
Private Speed Ticketing Electronic System
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) allow nodes, including vehicles and road side units, to communicate with each other. These networks are used with the purpose of optimizing traffic (reducing congestion and accidents), obtaining realtime road information (the vehicles can serve as information collectors) and giving authorities the possibility to supervise vehicles electronically (speed control, vehicular permits, etc). In VANETs, vehicles are equipped with tamper proof devices known as On-Board Units (OBUs) used to communicate with other vehicles and with other Road-Side Units (RSUs) part of the road infrastructure. In VANETs, vehicles and drivers ought to maintain their identities private, at the same time as they must keep accountable for their actions and, the information processed in the VANET must be totally reliable. In this section we sketch a speed ticketing electronic system which allows the transportation authorities to enforce speed limits over a stretch of road, at the same time as the identity of the non-offenders vehicles is kept private 2 . 
m7. T S → T A: {sp ticket}
Where: The system consists of :
-A Ticketing Authority (TA) responsible for managing unique vehicle identifiers, as for example the Electronic Chassis Number (ECN). -On-Board Units (OBUs). An OBU is a tamper proof device included in each vehicle on the road. The ECN of a vehicle is inserted in the vehicle's OBU such that when a vehicle receives a {request id} token, enquiring about its identity, the OBU responds with the ECN encrypted. -Road-Side Units (RSUs) which periodically broadcast messages over Dedicated Short Range Channels requesting the identity of the passing by vehicles. The RSUs compose sp evidence tokens from the responses received from the passing vehicles by attaching the time to the vehicle identification token. This new token called sp evidence is sent to a Ticketing Server (TS). -The Ticketing Server (TS) receives sp evidence tokens from two different RSUs and issue sp ticket tickets for those vehicles which took less that the permitted time to cover a distance between the locations of the two RSUs. The TS is also responsible for informing the Ticketing Authority (TA) about which vehicles have over passed the speed limit over the stretch of road being monitored.
( Table 1 details the messages involved in the protocol.) Although the messages exchanged between principals are detailed in Table 1 , we will use the extension of Rubin's logic to formally represent each participant entity behavior list and the privacy related goals to be satisfied at the end of the message exchange.
Speed Ticketing Formal Verification
-New action Generate-ticket(ECN, t 1 , t 2 , t l ) Condition: {{ECN } K , t 1 , t 2 , t l } ⊂ P OSS(T S) such that: (t 2 − t 1 ) < t l
Result: P OSS(T S) := P OSS(T S) ∪ {T S ∥ ECN
Description: This action is used to issue a sp ticket when the difference between t 2 and t 1 is below a certain legal limit.
-Global definitions:
• W , the world.
• P = {T A, T S, RSU 1 , RSU 2 , OBU }, is the set of participant entities.
•
is the set of inference rules.
• ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, T RU ST ij = 1. Note that, unlike the previous example, all entities trust each other in following the protocol instructions. This is a reasonable assumption as all principals belong for the same authority, no tampering is possible on the OBU and the OBU trusts the authority responsible for the ticketing system.
• BV = {t 1 , t 2 , t limit , sp evidence 1 , sp evidence 2 , sp ticket}. Where t limit indicates the minimum legal time permitted in driving between units RSU 1 and RSU 2 .
-Principal RSU 1 : 
P OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S)
OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S) ∪ {{ECN } KT S , t 2 } generate ticket(ECN, t 1 , t 2 , t limit ), P OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S) ∪ {T S ∥ ECN ∥ t 1 ∥ t 2 } Forget({sp evidence 1 }, P OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S) − {sp evidence 1 } Forget({sp evidence 2 }, P OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S) − {sp evidence 2 } Forget({ECN } K T S ), P OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S) − {ECN } KT S Forget secret({ECN }), P OSS(T S) = P OSS(T S) − {ECN }, (G1) Observers(ECN ) = Observers(ECN ) − {T S}, (G2)
⊓ ⊔
Conclusions
In this paper we have described what we believe is tractable and powerful formalism for the formal verification of privacy-enhancing cryptography protocols. The original logic introduced by Rubin offered a major contribution for the reasoning of non-monotonic protocols although it needed a few amendments and updates to it, for example, the concept of signature verification used in Rubin's logic was, in our opinion, invalid. The new extended logic L-PEP has served to formally verify the dual signature of the protocol SET and a speed ticketing electronic non-monotonic system. The logic has enabled us to reason about private data protection laws by which transportation authorities can only store information about offender vehicles and where tracing of non-offenders is not permitted.
Future Work
Currently, we are analyzing a privacy-enhancing authentication and access control protocol based on blind signatures and recursive hashing [16] . Additionally, a more advanced version of the speed ticketing electronic service here described, including identity based encryption, is under verification using the described formalism.
Finally, the extended logic also intends to set the basis for future automated design of multi-party privacy-enhancing cryptographic protocols by means of evolutionary computation and artificial intelligence techniques. Previous works on this area are [17, 18] . The logic just presented will allow for similar techniques to synthesize privacy related protocols.
